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บทคัดย่อ
บทความวิจัยนี้น�าเสนอผลการส�ารวจทางทฤษฎีในการใช้ภาษีตามมูลค่า (Ad Valorem Tax) 
และภาษีเฉพาะ (Specific Tax) หรือ “ภาษีแบบต่อหน่วย” (Unit Tax) กับสินค้าในระบบตลาด 
ที่มีการแข่งขันไม่สมบูรณ์ เช่น สินค้าในอุตสาหกรรมเครื่องดื่มมึนเมาและสินค้าสาธารณูปโภค ขั้นตอนแรก 
ได้มกีารสร้างกรอบทฤษฎีส�าหรบัการวิเคราะห์สถานการณ์จ�าลองทีส่�าคญัสองชดุ แบบจ�าลองชดุแรกแสดงถงึ 
กรณีของหน่วยผลิตผูกขาดที่รัฐเป็นเจ้าของ ซึ่งก�าหนดราคาตามกฎของแรมซีย์ (Ramsey Pricing) 
แบบจ�าลองชุดที่สอง แสดงกรณีหน่วยผลิตที่เป็นของเอกชนภายใต้การควบคุมของรัฐ ผู้ซึ่งเป็นผู้ก�าหนด
อัตราภาษีทั้งสองชนิด ผลการวิจัยชี้ให้เห็นว่ามีความเป็นไปได้ที่มาตรการภาษีแบบผสมผสานสามารถ 
น�าไปสู่ผลลัพธ์ที่ใกล้เคียงกับกรณีก�าหนดราคาตามกฎของแรมซีย์เม่ืออัตราภาษีตามมูลค่าเข้าใกล้ 1 
นอกจากนี้ การใช้ภาษีเฉพาะและภาษีตามมูลค่าแบบผสมผสานยังสามารถน�ามาเป็นเครื่องมือ
ส�าหรับภาครัฐในการปรับสมดุลในระบบตลาดเพื่อให้เกิดราคาและปริมาณของสินค้าอันพึงปรารถนา 
และในขณะเดียวกัน ยังสามารถท�าให้รายได้รัฐบาลจากการจัดเก็บภาษีบรรลุเป้าหมายด้วย
ค�ำส�ำคัญ: ภาษีเฉพาะ  ภาษีตามมูลค่า  ภาษีปรับสมดุล  กฎภาษีแรมซีย์
Abstract
This paper presents a theoretical exploration, illustrating the consequences of employing 
various combinations of ad valorem and specific taxes on goods in imperfect competition, 
such as those of the brewery and utilities sectors. Having constructed a theoretical framework 
for analysis, two major sets of simulations are conducted. The first illustrated the case of 
state-owned single firm in an economy in which Ramsey pricing is obtained. The second 
diverts to the case of a privately owned business governed by the state, determining the tax 
rates. The results indicate that there can be possible outcome close to Ramsey in privately 
owned business as the ad valorem tax approaches unity.  Moreover, a combination of specific 
and ad valorem taxes can provide a tool for the government to fine-tune the desired outcome 
of price, quantity and, simultaneously, achieve the revenue target.
Keywords: Specific Tax, Ad Valorem Tax, Corrective Taxes, Ramsey Tax
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Introduction
In a competitive economy, a firm is 
a price-taker, selling at a price set at marginal 
cost and earning a zero profit. Thus, the 
only variable under control is the level of 
output. In such case, the effects of commodity 
taxes are simply passed forward by the firm 
onto the consumers. On the contrary, prices in 
imperfectly competitive markets, such as those 
of the brewery and utilities sectors, are set 
at a level above marginal cost. As a result, 
an increase in cost stemming from taxation 
may not necessari ly be passed on to 
consumers. In addition to the price effects, 
imperfectly competitive firms may earn 
non-zero profits and, hence, the effects due 
to taxation need to be cautiously determined. 
The effects of ad valorem and specific 
taxes in imperfect competition are, nonetheless, 
not identical1. The calculation of the effects 
of taxation on price and profits, therefore, 
requires comparative statics of the targeted 
industry. This leads to different levels of the 
revenue earned and the welfare effects when 
employing each of these taxes. Consequently, 
the paper takes into account, in accordance 
with the policy-oriented viewpoint, the revenue 
changes and the counter-distortionary effects 
on the distortions caused by non-competitive 
behaviours. The paper continues with an 
assessment of the idea that the combination 
of the two types of taxes are at the optimal 
level as suggested and mentioned in Delipalla 
and Keen [1], Myles [2-3] and Keen [4].  
The organisation of this paper is as 
follows. The second section reviews the 
literature on taxation of goods in imperfect 
competition. The third section presents the 
theoretical framework. Section IV applies the 
theoretical framework to the simulations. The 
fourth section concludes and discusses the 
policy implications.
Backg r o und  a nd  T h e o r e t i c a l 
Development
The taxes on goods in the context of 
this paper comprise of the ad valorem 
and the specific taxes. The analysis and 
comparison of the two taxes reflect one 
of the oldest literatures in public finance, 
dat ing back to the ear l ier wr i t ing of 
a mathematical economic pioneer, Antoin 
Augustin Cournot, published in 1838. 
The issue has been of continuing intellectual 
interests due to its all-time policy relevance. 
This is reflected by a series of new 
theoretical development until the present days. 
The findings reveal the different effects of 
the two taxes on considerations such as 
consumer’s welfare, firm’s profits and product 
quality and variety. Before continuing further, 
it, therefore, proves crucial to sketch the 
fundamental differences according to how 
these two taxes are defined.  
As generally defined, ad valorem tax is 
a tax proportional to the price of the object 
being taxed., for example, the value-added 
tax (VAT). [6] Hence, the calculation of 
1
Wicksell [5] originally shows that equivalence of ad valorem and specific taxes does not hold in monopoly 
under constant marginal cost. In such setting, with a given level of revenue, ad valorem tax leads to a lower 
level of consumer price and greater output.
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ad valorem tax does not require a precise 
quantity of the good sold, so long as its value 
is reflected in the price.  Ad valorem tax has 
its well-known multiplier effect. That is, should 
government require an increase in tax revenue 
by 1 Baht per unit of good, the consumer 
price must increase by the amount 1/(1-tv) 
> 1, where 0 < tv < 1 is the ad valorem 
tax rate. From the producer’s perspective, 
however, product improvements become more 
costly as a result of this multiplier effect. 
Ceteris paribus, there are suppositions that 
ad valorem taxation encourages relatively low 
quality products. Nevertheless, ad valorem 
taxes are often viewed as relatively fairer, due 
to its proportionality as compared to the lump-
sum specific taxes, the burden of which falls 
heavily on poorer consumers who buy cheaper 
and lower quality goods.  
Specific tax is a tax levied as a fixed 
sum on each physical unit of the good taxed, 
regardless of its price [6], for example, 
an excise duty on alcohol and tobacco. 
Although specific taxes have the administrative 
advantage for the simplicity of measuring 
quantities, the specification of the one-unit of 
good may be debatable in practice. Being a 
lump-sum tax, it does not have any multiplier 
effect as does the ad valorem. Hence, 
a 1 Baht increase in tax revenue requires 
a 1 Baht increase in consumer price. 
As the taxable unit of good may be debatable, 
an increase in specific taxation may leave 
out some elements in the characteristics of 
the product untaxed. As a result, there are 
suppositions that consumption will shift to 
these untaxed characteristics, encouraging 
producers to upgrade their product quality. 
Another way of looking at this consumption 
shifting is to consider the price of high-quality 
brand relative to that of the low-quality brand. 
An increase in lump-sum tax on the consumer 
price would lower the relative price of the 
high-quality brand and hence induce higher 
consumption trend towards the high-quality 
brand. Another distinction is that, unlike the 
ad valorem tax, expressed as a percentage of 
the price, the real value of specific tax can 
be eroded by inflation.   
When relaxing the assumptions of perfect 
competition, there are various settings between 
the two extremes of perfect competition and 
monopoly to be chosen as a starting point. 
Where the point of analysis begins is based 
on some of the major specifications to be 
considered. First, the nature of the product 
may be homogeneous or differentiated. 
Second, the firms in the selected industries 
may choose different strategic variables, 
namely the Bertrand price setting or the 
Cournot quantity setting. Third, the objective 
of the firms comprising the industry may 
be to maximise profit either individually 
or co-operatively. The fourth consideration 
is the possibility and difficulty of new entries. 
These specifications differ in the vast 
contributions throughout the literature.  
Seade [7] studies the comparative static 
effects of changes in cost conditions, namely 
the uniform excise tax, in a symmetric Cournot 
or conjectural-variations model of oligopoly. 
The symmetry assumption is eventually 
relaxed to consider the general homogeneous-
output case. The result ing movements 
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in individual outputs, price, profits and market 
structure are derived and examined. Adapting 
from the case of pure monopoly, a conjectural-
variations oligopoly, with linear cost curve 
for simplicity, is analysed by considering 
the equation, p/= c’/(1-1/ε), where p is the 
price, c is the firm’s cost function and ε is 
the firm’s perceived elasticity (which must 
exceed 1 for profit-maximum). ε is constant 
along the demand curve and is equivalent to 
nε*/λ where ε* is the true market elasticity 
which is assumed to be constant, n is 
the number of firms and λ is the conjectural-
variation behavioural parameter. As noted 
in ear l ier papers such as Stern [8], 
and Salop and Scheffman [9], it is shown 
that, price and profit over-shifting in oligopoly 
is possible. In fact, de Meza [10] has shown 
similar results along this line by looking at the 
tax incidence of the change in unit production 
tax with an application of the theory of derived 
demand.  
Seade [7] further questions the ambiguity 
of cost rises on prices and profits in oligopoly 
as he wrote, “A good explanation in theory, for 
profit-over-shifting of cost or tax rises, (then) 
seems to be lacking.” The aim of his paper 
is to show the ‘characterised outcomes’ and 
not just the possibility of the over-shifting in 
oligopoly. He asserts that the elasticity of the 
slope of demand, -Xp’’/p’ (X is the industry’s 
output), which is the second-order elasticity, 
plays an important role2. This elasticity of the 
slope of demand is represented by E whose 
relation with the ordinary demand elasticity, ε, 
can be expressed as E = 1+1/ε+η
εX
, where 
η
εX 
≡ X(dε/dX)/ε. This E is later referred 
to as “Seade’s E” in papers published 
thereafter.  In the case of linear costs and 
isoelastic demand curve, E = 1+1/ε.   
The result obtained in Seade [7] provides 
a general characterisation of the effects of 
specific tax increase on output, price and 
profit of oligopolistic firms. As excise tax 
rate rises, output falls unambiguously in all 
stable equilibria. The consumer’s price rises 
to the extent greater than the shift in marginal 
cost (ie., more than 100% shifting of tax to 
consumers) if and only if the E exceeds 1, 
which is always the case for isoelastic 
demands. In stable equilibrium with n Cournot 
firms under the symmetric assumption, 
E on ly needs to be less than n+1. 
This is always the case in oligopolistic industry 
with whatever market structure, n, and the 
behavioural parameters, λ. Consequently, 
the profit of each firm in the industry rises 
due to the increase in price more than 
sufficient in offsetting the fall in sales volume 
if and only if E exceeds a firm-specific 
number, rounded up to 2, and exactly 2 
under symmetry. 
Myles [3] sums up Seade’s results 
and illustrates the mechanism as can be 
viewed in terms of convexity of the inverse 
demand function. Having defined the shifting 
2
Relying essentially upon the fact that the market faces imperfect competition where prices are marked up 
above marginal costs, the extent to which tax changes are passed on to consumers depends on the size of the 
price mark-up factor. Under the assumption of isoelastic demand curve, it is determined solely by the elasticity 
of demand and the extent to which the elasticity of demand changes as output changes, that is, the elasticity 
of the slope of demand, E.
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parameter, and using stability restriction as 
formally derived in Seade [11], it is shown that 
the first order derivative of inverse demand 
function, 
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along the demand curve and is equivalent to n*/ where * is the true market elasticity which is 
assumed to be constant, n is the number of firms and  is the conjectural-variation behavioural 
parameter. As noted in earlier papers such as Stern [8], and Salop and Scheffman [9], it is shown that, 
price and profit over-shifting in oligopoly is possible. In fact, de Meza [10] has shown similar results 
along this line by looking at the tax incidence of the change in unit production tax with an application of 
the theory of derived demand.   
Seade [7] further questions the ambiguity of cost rises on prices and profits in oligopoly as he 
wrote, “A good explanation in theory, for profit-over-shifting of cost or tax rises, (then) seems to be 
lacking.” The aim of his paper is to show the ‘characterised outcomes’ and not just the possibility of the 
over-shifting in oligopoly. He asserts that the elasticity of the slope of demand, -Xp’’/p’ (X is the 
industry’s output), which is the second-order elasticity, plays an important role2. This elasticity of the 
slope of demand is represented by E whose relation with the ordinary demand elasticity, , can be 
expressed as E = 1+1/+X, where X  X(d/dX)/. This E is later referred to as “Seade’s E” in 
papers published thereafter.  In the case of linear costs and isoelastic demand curve, E = 1+1/.    
 The result obtained in Seade [7] provides a general characterisation of the effects of specific 
tax increase on output, price and profit of oligopolistic firms. As excise tax rate rises, output falls 
unambiguously in all stable equilibria. The consumer’s price rises to the extent greater than the shift in 
marginal cost (ie., more than 100% shifting of tax to consumers) if and only if the E exceeds 1, which is 
always the case for isoelastic demands. In stable equilibrium with n Cournot firms under the symmetric 
assumption, E only needs to be less than n+1. This is always the case in oligopolistic industry with 
whatever market structure, n, and the behavioural parameters, . Consequently, the profit of each firm 
in the industry rises due to the increase in price more than sufficient in offsetting the fall in sales volume 
if and only if E exceeds a firm-specific number, rounded up to 2, and exactly 2 under symmetry.  
 Myles [3] sums up Seade’s results and illustrates the mechanism as can be viewed in terms of 
convexity of the inverse demand function. Having defined the shifting parameter, and using stability 
restriction as formally derived in Seade [11], it is shown that the first order derivative of inverse demand 
function, i/Xi, must exceed -Xi2i/Xi2. Hence, the second order derivative of inverse demand 
function with respect to output,  i/Xi2, should be positive. This implies convexity of the inverse 
demand function. Thus, the same results as in Seade [7] are obtained, with E = -Xi2i/Xi2 / i/Xi , 
E>1 causes over-shifting, E = 1 full shifting and E< 1 under-shifting. The same result as in Seade (1985) 
applies for the increase in profit level as a result of an increase in tax rate where E>2.      
                                                 
2Relying essentially upon the fact that the market faces imperfect competition where prices are marked 
up above marginal costs, the extent to which tax changes are passed on to consumers depends on the 
size of the price mark-up factor. Under the assumption of isoelastic demand curve, it is determined 
solely by the elasticity of demand and the extent to which the elasticity of demand changes as output 
changes, that is, the elasticity of the slope of demand, E. 
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E>1 causes over-shifting, E = 1 full shifting 
and E<1 under-shifting. The same result as 
in Seade (1985) applies fo  the increase i
profit level as a result of an increase in tax 
rate where E>2.    
Ref rring to Myles [12-13], Myles
[14] mentions about furth r effects following 
taxation under imp rfect competition. One of
them is the dependence of a firm’s price 
on goods upon the prices of goods in other 
firms in its own industry and the prices of 
any complementary or substitutable goods. 
These are ‘induced effects’. The major 
implication of the findings in this paper is 
that there is a plausible tax design which 
can exploit the different rates of tax-shifting 
amongst industries and the profit effects so 
as to raise welfare level. Accordingly, this 
may require taxes on intermediate goods and 
a differentiated labour tax across industries. 
Newbury [15] further demonstrates that if 
an optimal tax on a certain good should be 
positive, but the good cannot be taxed, then 
input taxes should be a partial substitutes for 
the missing final taxes. Ebrill and Slutsky [16] 
obtains similar results of regulated industries in 
developing countries.
Delipalla and Keen [1] looks at the 
comparative effects of ad valorem and specific 
taxation compared in two models of oligopoly, 
one with fr e entry (the generalised Cournot
model) and the other without free entry 
(the model of free entry oligopoly). The 
paper carries out the analysis by varying 
conditions of homogeneous-product oligopoly. 
With respect to the concept of ‘matched pairs’ 
of ad valor m and specific tax s, they focus
on the effects of tax reforms having no ‘first 
round’ effect on tax revenue. They consider 
a tax change in the form of Pdtv= -dts>0, 
where tv is the ad valorem tax rate and 
ts is the specific tax rate. The change in 
tax favours the balance towards ad valorem 
taxation whilst leaving total tax payments 
at the initial equilibrium price unchanged.
The finding in Delipalla and Keen 
[1] shows that ad valorem taxation leads 
to relatively low consumer price and high 
tax revenue. Moreover, when free entry is 
precluded, it also leads to low profits. With free 
entry, ad valorem taxation dominates specific 
taxation in terms of welfare consideration. 
The condition for which specific taxation 
raises welfare are more restrictive. This 
proves to be so in both models. Regarding 
the optimal tax structure, they address three 
sets of welfare and policy-related issues, 
having relaxed the constraint that profits 
be non-negative. The first issue refers to 
employing the tax combinations as a corrective 
measure to meet the required revenue under 
a supposition that the government has 
unrestricted ability to employ lump-sum tax. 
It has been proven that the optimal corrective 
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tax combination requires that one of the taxes 
being a subsidy so as to ensure marginal 
cost pricing. The second issue refers to that 
of Ramsey problem of maximising consumer 
welfare subject to revenue constraint. 
The third issue is that of a Leviathan 
model which requires a tax combination 
that maximises tax revenue. Restricted to be 
non-negative, it has been proven that the 
optimal specific taxation required for both 
Ramsey and Leviathan problems is zero.
Myles [2] asserts that more can be 
achieved by combining both ad valorem and 
specific taxes rather than employing either of 
these taxes individually. The derivations show 
that the optimal combination of both taxes can 
lead to Ramsey prices
3 in a private ownership 
with imperfect competition. The analysis is 
divided into two institutional settings: state 
ownership (when lump-sum tax instruments 
are unavailable) and private-ownership (when 
government imposes specific and ad valorem 
taxes). The labour input is assumed to be 
in competitive market. The ad valorem tax 
reduces the gradient of the marginal revenue 
curve, thus, the perceived influence of the 
monopoly on price falls. On the other hand, 
the specific tax adds to the marginal cost.  
Theoretical Framework
This section sets up a theoretical 
framework applicable for the simulation in the 
next section.  In perfectly competitive industry, 
there is only price effect since all firms earn 
zero profits. Therefore, consumer prices 
increase by just the amount of the tax in the 
case of horizontal long run supply curve and 
by less than the amount of tax in the case of 
upward sloping supply curve. Thus, it is not 
possible for the amount of price increase to 
be above that of the tax.  
The effects in the case of perfect 
competition do not apply when there is 
imperfect competition.  Complexity arises 
when considering different forms of taxation 
(ie., specific and ad valorem taxes). 
In perfect competition, both taxes have 
identical effects. This equivalence breaks 
down in imperfect competition.  In such 
setting, there are both price and profit 
effects. Thus, an increase in cost due to 
a change in taxation need not be reflected 
in an identical increase in price. When price 
rises by more than the amount of the tax, 
there is over-shifting. When it rises by 
less than the amount of the tax, there 
is under-shifting. As illustrated in Seade 
[7], Stern [8] and Myles [14], assuming 
constant marginal cost, concavity of industry 
demand leads to under-shifting and sufficient 
convexity causes over-shifting. The theoretical 
framework of this section is developed based 
on the foundation laid by earlier ones. 
To make applicable to an oligopolistic industry, 
a modification and restructuring of the model 
is compulsory.  
3
Ramsey price is referred to a set of price set by the government in respect of maximising social welfare, 
whilst collecting a specified level of revenue, not allowing lump-sum taxes or subsidies. This represents the 
second-best condition, given marginal cost not feasible without lump-sum subsidies.
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To begin with, consideration is focused 
on a conjectural variation model.  In congruent 
with the previous contributions, the model in 
this paper encompasses a market structure 
ranging from competi t ive outcomes to 
monopoly as earlier described. It is assumed 
that the industry consists of n identical firms, 
each producing a homogeneous good. Since 
symmetry is assumed, xi, which denotes firm 
i’s output, can be expressed in terms of 
the industry’s total output, X, as xi = X/n. 
Firm i’s total cost of production at a given 
level of output is represented by the cost 
function C(xi). It is assumed that there is 
increasing returns to scale. That is, there 
is a non- increasing marginal cost where 
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(1)
Existing theoretical models show that a typical firm, i, earns an after-tax profit as expressed 
in equation (2).
  
7 
 
 
 
Existing theoretical models show that a typical firm, i, earns an after-tax profit as expressed in 
equation (2). 
 
      (2)  
     
The strategic interaction amongst firms, ie., the conjectural variation, is shown in equation (3). 
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Each firm conjectures that when i changes its output xi, other firms’ responses will be λ. Th  value 
of λ is zero in perfect competition (ie., Bertrand conjecture), unity when there is Cournot conjectures and 
λ=n in tacit collu ion when each firm believes that all other active firms will behave in the 
sa e way as it does. The analyses in this paper assume λ
7 
 
 
 
Existing theoretical models show that a typical firm, i, earns an after-tax profit as expressed in 
equation (2). 
 
      (2)  
     
The strategic interaction amongst firms, ie., the conjectural variation, is shown in equation (3).
           (3)  
         
     
 Each firm conjectures that wh n it changes its output xi, other firms’ r sponses ill be . The 
value of  is zero in perfect competition (ie., Bertr nd conjecture), unity when there is Cournot 
conjectures and =n in t cit collusion whe  each firm believes that all other active firms will behave in 
the same way as it does. The analyses in this pa er assume (0,n], of which the case of perfect 
competition is omitted. 
 Through maximising the profit function in (2), the first order condition can be obtained in 
equation (4). 
 
     
         (4)  
    
 
where tv and ts are th  ad v lorem and specific tax rates, respectively. From equation (4), the 
equilibrium price, qi*, can be calculated as in equation (5). 
 
    
    
            (5) 
 
where 
          (6) 
and   
         
                
              (7) 
 
  ),()()1( iii xCxtsXqtv 
0)1( 













ii
ii
i
i
x
Cts
x
X
X
qxqtv
dx
d
































tv
tsxC
ne
xXtv
tsxCq
i 1
/
/
1
1
1
/*
.
X
q
q
Xe



ne
xX i

/
1
1

 .,no
dx
dX
i

,n], of t  case of perfect 
competition is omitted.
4
Myles [2] also takes into account qk, the representative consumer price of some other good, so as to consider 
the ‘indirect’ or ‘induced’ effects of the changes in prices and profits in industry i as a result of tax changes 
in industries other than i.
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where tv and ts are the ad valorem and specific tax rates, respectively. From equation (4), 
the equilibrium price, qi*, can be calculated as in equation (5).
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By means of totally differentiating equation (4) through varying output and tax rate, equation 
(8) is obtained.
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Substituting equation (11) into equation (10), the effect of the change in ad valorem tax rate on 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
         
        (10.2) 
 
Under perfect competition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Hence, considering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
relatively less than that of the specific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 under imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expect the results of the regressions of the price of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shape of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing literature has already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degree of shifting depends on how the values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as /n, represents the extent of competition perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
extreme cases are when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not be 
affected by their output changes ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole market, resulting in tacit collusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to determine the extent of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
they may be able to exploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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of  is to deter in  the extent of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the mark t elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive that they have som  degree of market power in which 
they may be able to exploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
         
        (10.2) 
 
Under perfect competition, w re  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Hence, considering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
relatively less than that of the specific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 under imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expect the results of the regr ssions of the price of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shape of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing literature has lready shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degree of shifting depends on how the values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as /n, represents the extent of competition perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
extreme cases are when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not be 
affected by their output changes ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole market, resulting in tacit collusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to determine the extent of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
they may be able to exploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
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Under perfect c mpe ition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  How ver, under 
mperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. H nce, considering equ tions (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
r latively less than that of th  specific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less an 1 when  > 1 und r imperfect competition . Fro  the formul  in (10.2), one could 
expect the results of the regressions of the price of good as depend nt variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in he solu ions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price ar  dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
th  c njec u l variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on shape of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. E isting literatur  has already shown that sufficient convexity of arket demand 
leads to over-shifting and conc vity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutio s of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is c ns ant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irre pecti  of  and n . I  other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
th  degree of shifting depends on how the values of A a d E will offset ea h other. Lastly, the term , 
d f n a /n, presents the ext nt of competiti  perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
extreme cases are when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not b  
affected by their output changes ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s el sticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole market, resulting in tacit c l usion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to determine the extent of over-shifti g or under-shifting ffect of th  market elasticity of demand. 
This  becom s mp rtant when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
th y may be able to exploit the market ema d curve.   
To se  the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differ n ated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
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Under perfect competition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, wher    1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Henc , considering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becom s 
relativ ly less than that of e specific tax as the values  and  increases si  /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less th n 1 when  > 1 under imperf ct comp ti ion . From the formula in (10.2), ne could 
expect th  r sults of the regres ions of th  price f good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of sp cific tax should exceed that of the ad valor m ax.  
 It an be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that he eff cts of b th ad
valorem and specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether th e is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shape of the market demand curve relative to that f the firm’s
marginal cost curve. Existing literature has already shown that suffi ient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investi ate each of the 
elements comprisi g the solutions of the equations (9) nd (10.2). The t rm A, which is negativ , is th
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established result  show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In ther cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degre  of shifting depends on how he values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as /n, represents the extent of competiti n perceived by the firms in the in ustry. The two 
extreme cases ar wh n firms conjectu e that th total industry outp t and, thus, pric  will not be 
affected by t ir output changes ( = 0,  = 0) d w n the firm’s elasticity of dem nd is id ntica  to 
hat of the wh le mark , resulting  tacit collusio  a d joint profi  maximisati  ( = n,  = 1). The ol  
of  is to d termine the xt t of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market lastici y of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive tha  they have some degree of market power in hich 
they m y be ble to exploit the m rket d mand curv .   
To se  the effe t of the tax changes o  producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with resp ct to ts and tv as in (13) nd (14), respec iv ly. 
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In ord r to compare the eff ct of ad v lorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
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Und r p rfect competition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperf ct competition, wher   1 and  > 0, it i  possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. H nce, onsidering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
rel tiv ly less than that of the sp ific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 nder imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expe  the r ults of the regressions of th  price of good as dep ndent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
It can be observed in the solutions of equati ns (9) nd (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price re dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
he conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting pends on the shape f the mark t demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal co t curv . Existing literature h s already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads o over-shifting a d o cavity le ds to under-shifting. It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
el ments comprising the solutions of the equations (9) nd (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, i ., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E xceeds 1, irrespective of  nd n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the egree of shifting d p ds n how the values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as / , represent  the xtent of competition perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
xtreme cases are when fir s conjecture that the total i dustry output and, thus, price will not be 
affe ted by their outp t chang s ( = 0,  = 0)  when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole mark t, resulting in tacit collusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to termine th  ext t of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important w n firms perceive that th y have some degree of market power in which 
they may be able to expl it the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on prod cer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price o  a unit change in tax revenu  with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equa ion (10.2).  
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Under perfect competiti n, re  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Hence, con idering equ tio s (9), (10.2) nd (11), the effect of ad valor m tax becomes
relatively l ss than that f the specifi  tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 under imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expect the esul s of the regressions of the pric  of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coeffici nt of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly mod l based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shap  of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing liter ure as already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity l ads t  u d r-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with re pect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The t rm E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simpl t case where there i  constant retur s to cale, i ., A = 0, established result  how there will be 
over-shifting hen E xce ds 1, ir spective f  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
t  degree of shifting depends on how t  valu s of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defi ed a  /n, represents the extent of c mpetition perceiv d by the firms in the industry. The two 
extr m  cas s a  when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not be 
affected by their utput c ang s ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to
t at of the whole market, resulting in acit c llusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is t  determine the extent of over-shifting or und -shifting effect of th mark t elasticity of demand. 
This  becom s important when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
they may be abl  to xploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differ ntiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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ad valorem tax. 
It can be observed in the solutions 
of equations (9) and (10.2) that the 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
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Under perfect competition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Hence, considering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
relatively less than that of the specific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 under imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expect the results of the regressions of the price of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shape of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing literature has already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degree of shifting depends on how the values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as /n, represents the extent of competition perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
extreme cases are when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not be 
affecte  by their out ut changes ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole market, resulting in tacit collusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to determine the extent of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
they may be able to exploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
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Under perfect competition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Hence, considering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
relatively less than that of the specific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 under imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expect the results of the regressions of the price of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shape of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing literature has already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degree of shifting depends on how the values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as /n, represents the extent of competition perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
extreme c ses are when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not b  
affect d by their output changes ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole market, resulting in tacit collusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to determine th  extent of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
they may be able to exploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of th  specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit c ange in tax r venue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, i ., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
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Und r perfect competition, wh re  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 and  > 0, it is possible to ave under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. He ce, considering equations (9), (10.2) nd (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
relatively less than that of th  specific tax as th  values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 u der imperf ct competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
exp ct the results of the re ressions of the price of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coeffici nt of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price are dep ndent upon the ad v lorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural vari tions oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifti g or under-shifting depends on the shape of th  market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing literature has already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to ov r-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
eleme ts comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
ch nge in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degree of s ifting depends on ho  the valu s of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
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 Using equations (5), (9) and (10), equations (13) and (14) can be solved. There is under-
shifting when the expressions (13) and (14) are less than zero, and over-shifting in the opposite case.  
When the expressions are equal to zero, full shifting results.     
From equation (2), the aggregate profit function for an industry is represented in equation (15). 
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Thus, the effects of the change in tax rates on the aggregate profit are shown in (16) and (17). 
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 By substituting the values in (5), (9) ad (10), equations (16) and (17) can be solved. Ad 
valorem tax rate has a direct influence on the change in the industry profit as a result of the change in 
both taxes. Hence, it can be observed that the ad valorem tax rate is inversely related to the industry 
profit. In line with the the revenue-neutral approach in Myles (1996), as ad valorem tax rate increases, 
consumer price is lowered.   
 
Simulations and Results 
 This section presents a numerical illustration of the consequences of employing various 
combinations of ad valorem and specific taxes. The simulation models an economy which comprises of 
a government, a consumer and an industry with n firms producing a homogeneous output x and using 
labour as the only input. The consumer’s welfare is represented by a utility function in (18). 
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Using equations (5), (9) and 0), equations (13) and (14) can b  solv d. 
There is u der-shifting when the expressions (13) and (14) are less than zero, 
and over-shifting in the opposite cas .  When the expres ions are equal to zero, full shifting 
results.    
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By substituting the values in (5), (9) ad (10), equations (16) and (17) can be solved. 
Ad valorem tax rate has a direct influence on the change in the industry profit as a result of 
the change in both taxes. Hence, it can be observed that the ad valorem tax rate is inversely 
related to the industry profit. In line with the the revenue-neutral approach in Myles (1996), 
as ad valorem tax rate increases, consumer price is lowered.  
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This section presents a numerical illustration of the consequences of employing 
various combinations of ad valorem and specific taxes. The simulation models an economy 
which comprises of a government, a consumer and an industry with n firms producing 
a homogeneous output x and using labour as the only input. The consumer’s welfare 
is represented by a utility function in (18).
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where U is the consumer’s utility function, L is the labour employed and g and h are constant. It 
is assumed that the labour market is competitive and the wage rate is set as a numeraire. Using 
the same notations as indicated earlier in this Chapter, the industry’s inverse demand function is 
expressed in equation (18).
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where C(X) is the cost function, C represents the fixed cost for which it is assumed that C = 0 in this 
simulation, and k is a constant marginal cost. 
The working of the simulation is divided into two institutional settings. The first consideration 
refers to an economy in which there is a single firm owned by the government. It is assumed that the 
government chooses the optimal Ramsey pricing, being unable to employ lump-sum tax instruments.  
This represents an optimal public sector pricing of which no other policy would yield a higher welfare 
level. Hence, the outcome obtained from the first institutional setting can be treated as an index for 
considering whether the second institutional setting, discussed later in this section, could yield an 
outcome close or equivalent to the optimal level obtainable.   
Under the state-ownership setting, the government chooses the optimal Ramsey price for the 
good x by maximising the indirect welfare utility function in (21). 
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where V(q, Y) is the consumer’s indirect utility function, Y is the lump-sum income set to be zero due to 
the inability of the government to levy lump-sum tax, R is the government’s required revenue and the 
other variables carry the same notation as indicated above. By substituting (18) and (19) into equation 
(20), the indirect utility function that the government has to maximise in equation (21) can be expressed 
as a Lagrangian function in (21.1). 
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where l is the Lagrangian function and m is the Lagrangian multiplier. By differentiating (21.1) with 
respect to q and m, the optimal consumer price, q*, for the Ramsey model is obtained. Consequently, 
the equilibrium level of industry output, X, and consumer welfare, V, can be solved. Table 1 shows the 
results of Simulation I for Ramsey model. 
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where C(X) is the cost function, C represents the fixed cost for which it is assumed that C = 
0 in this simulation, and k is a constant marginal cost.
The working of the simulation is divided into two institutional settings. The first consideration 
refers to an economy in which there is a single firm owned by the government. It is assumed 
that the government chooses the optimal Ramsey pricing, being unable to employ lump-sum tax 
instruments.  This represents an optimal public sector pricing of which no other policy would yield 
a higher welfare level. Hence, the outcome obtained from the first institutional setting can be 
treated as an index for considering whether the second institutional setting, discussed later in this 
section, could yield an outcome close or equivalent to the optimal level obtainable.  
Under the state-ownership setting, the government chooses the optimal Ramsey price for the 
good x by maximising the indirect welfare utility function in (21).
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grangian function and m is the Lagran ian multiplier. By differentiating (21.1) 
with respect to q and m, the optimal consumer price, q*, for the Ramsey model is obtained. 
Conseq ently, the quilibrium level of industry output, X, and consumer welfare, V, can be solved.
Table 1. shows the results of Simulation I for Ramsey model.
Table 1. Result of Simulation I: Ramsey Pricing
Required Revenue = 1200
Parameters: a = 185, b = 0.04, g = 1200, h = 0.7, k = 1, L = 70
Q* X* V*
7.3896 184.7044 209634.8
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The second institutional setting refers to 
the same economy in which there is a single 
industry and firms are privately owned.
5 
The government determines the level of ad 
valorem and specific tax to be levied. Using 
the previous tax model, firms in the industry 
will maximise the profit function expressed 
in (2). As for application to the beer model, 
the profit function in (2) will be maximised. 
The optimal consumer prices obtained from 
maximising (2) are dependent upon the values 
of tv and ts and, hence, they are denoted 
by q = q(tv, ts). Consequently, the optimal 
profit level is represented by π = π(tv, ts), 
and the consumption level X= X(tv, ts).  
In a private ownership economy with a 
government setting tax rates, the Ramsey 
price which is a solution in (4.36) can be 
obtained in the two models under the condition 
that there exists a combination of ad valorem 
and specific taxes, tv* and ts*, such that: (i.) 
the firm’s profit is non-negative, π(tv*, ts*) 
≥ 0, (ii.) q* = q(tv*, ts*), and (iii.) [tv*q(tv*, 
ts*) + ts*]X(tv*,  ts*) = R*, where R* is the 
government’s revenue target. [2] In simulation 
II which models an economy in which firms 
are privately owned, the combinations of 
ad valorem and specific taxes that satisfy 
these conditions are obtained. The results of 
simulation II are reported in Table 2. Table 2 
shows the results of applying the original tax 
model to simulation II.   
Table 2. Result of Simulation II: Private Ownership Economy
Required Revenue = 1200
Parameters: a = 185, b = 0.04, g = 1200, h = 0.7, k = 1, L = 70, 
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In order to compare the effect of ad valorem tax with that of the specific tax in the same scale, the 
impact on price of a unit change in tax revenue with respect to the change in ad valorem tax at initial 
price, ie., qdtv, is considered in equation (10.2).   
         
        (10.2) 
 
Under perfect competition, where  = 1 and  = 0, there is a full shifting of both taxes.  However, under 
imperfect competition, where   1 nd  > 0, it is possible to have under-shifting, full shifting or over-
shifting. Henc , considering equations (9), (10.2) and (11), the effect of ad valorem tax becomes 
relatively less than that of the specific tax as the values of  and  increases since /q = (q(1/))/q 
which is less than 1 when  > 1 under imperfect competition . From the formula in (10.2), one could 
expect the results of the regressions of the price of good as dependent variable in such a way that the 
coefficient of specific tax should exceed that of the ad valorem tax.  
 It can be observed in the solutions of equations (9) and (10.2) that the effects of both ad 
valorem and specific taxes on price are dependent upon the ad valorem tax rate. As this paper employs 
the conjectural variations oligopoly model based on the previous literature, whether there is tax over-
shifting or under-shifting depends on the shape of the market demand curve relative to that of the firm’s 
marginal cost curve. Existing literatur  has already shown that sufficient convexity of market demand 
leads to over-shifting and concavity leads to under-shifting.  It is now crucial to investigate each of the 
elements comprising the solutions of the equations (9) and (10.2). The term A, which is negative, is the 
change in the firm’s marginal costs (with respect to the change in market price) caused by a change in 
its own output. The term E is referred to Seade’s (1985) elasticity of the slope of demand. In the 
simplest case where there is constant returns to scale, ie., A = 0, established results show there will be 
over-shifting when E exceeds 1, irrespective of  and n . In other cases, with non-linear cost curves, 
the degree of shifting depends on how the values of A and E will offset each other. Lastly, the term , 
defined as /n, represents the extent of competition perceived by the firms in the industry. The two 
extreme cases are when firms conjecture that the total industry output and, thus, price will not be 
affected by their output changes ( = 0,  = 0) and when the firm’s elasticity of demand is identical to 
that of the whole market, resulting in tacit collusion and joint profit maximisation ( = n,  = 1). The role 
of  is to determine the extent of over-shifting or under-shifting effect of the market elasticity of demand. 
This  becomes important when firms perceive that they have some degree of market power in which 
they may be able to exploit the market demand curve.   
To see the effect of the tax changes on producer price in equation (12), the equation is 
differentiated with respect to ts and tv as in (13) and (14), respectively. 
ts
q
tv
q

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


ts
q
qtvq
q

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


= 1, n = 5
   tv ts Q X Π V
0.01 0.068 771.732 154.131 117593.6 176572.2
0.05 -29.559 745.784 155.169 114367.2 177705.3
0.15 -94.301 679.362 157.826 105862.8 180602.5
0.25 -145.185 610.628 160.575 96691.1 183595.4
0.5 -206.783 427.861 167.886 70463.9 191527.7
0.55 -207.03 389.296 169.428 64588.3 193196.7
0.65 -194.549 310.003 172.600 52133.8 196623.1
0.75 -163.944 227.688 175.893 38672.7 200172.6
0.85 -144.158 142.177 179.313 24114.8 203851.9
0.9 -81.720 98.164 181.073 16393.8 205742.5
0.91 -74.610 89.259 181.430 14812.5 206124.7
5
This can be treated as an extension of Myles’ [2] simulation for monopoly, with a further application 
on the brewery industry tax model.
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   tv ts Q X Π V
0.95 -44.053 53.279 182.869 8360.3 207668.3
0.98 -18.878 25.919 183.963 3384.2 208841.0
0.995 -5.552 12.117 184.515 851.1 209432.3
0.999 -1.915 8.422 184.663 170.5 209590.6
0.99999 -1.009 7.510 184.700 1.7 209629.6
Table 2. shows that the outcomes 
tend towards Ramsey pricing in Table 1 
as tv →1.  That is, as tv approaches 
unity, consumer prices become closer to 
7.39, the corresponding welfare levels are 
approaching 209634.0 and the profit levels 
are approaching zero as in Table 2. Therefore, 
it is possible to obtain a combination of ad 
valorem and specific taxation which leads, 
in the limit, to Ramsey pricing and zero profit. 
Hence, the welfare loss caused by imperfect 
competition can be eliminated. The ad valorem 
tax reduces the gradient of the marginal 
revenue curve and thus, reduces the effect 
of imperfect competition on consumer price. 
On the contrary, the specific tax reduces 
the marginal cost at the optimal. Thus, 
simultaneously employing both taxes enhances 
flexibility for manipulating the marginal cost 
and marginal revenue curve to intersect at the 
desired level of price and quantity.  
Conclusions and Discussion
The literature on ad valorem and specific 
taxation reveals that, despite a sufficient 
amount of theoretical discussion on the 
subject, there is relatively a small number 
of empirical analysis due to the difficulty to 
obtain micro level industry data. Moreover, 
the paper presents some simulation results 
as a theoretical exploration and exercise. 
This can be treated as a modification so 
as to make applicable for the analysis of 
certain industry of interest, such as those of 
the brewery and utilities sectors. The research 
shows the possibility of obtaining an outcome 
close to Ramsey in privately owned business 
of using taxes combination as ad valorem 
tax approaches unity. The analysis indicates 
several implications for the equations to be 
estimated for policy applications.
Nevertheless, ad valorem taxes are 
often viewed as relatively fairer, due to its 
proportionality as compared to the lump-sum 
specific taxes. The burden of specific taxes 
falls heavily on poorer consumers who buy 
cheaper and lower quality goods. However, 
there are suppositions that ad valorem taxation 
encourages relatively low quality products. 
Regarding the specific taxes, although 
they have the administrative advantage for 
the simplicity of measuring quantities, the 
specification of the one-unit of good may 
be debatable in practice. An increase in 
specific taxation may leave out some 
elements in the characteristics of the product 
untaxed. As a result, there are suppositions 
that consumption will shift to these untaxed 
Table 2. (Continued)
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characteristics, encouraging producers to 
upgrade their product quali ty. Another 
distinction is that, unlike the ad valorem tax, 
expressed as a percentage of the price, the 
real value of specific tax can be eroded by 
inflation. Overall, the simulations reflect the 
conceptual possibility that a combination of 
ad valorem and specific taxes can provide 
a tool for the government for fine-tuning the 
desired outcome of price and quantity and, 
simultaneously, achieve the revenue target in 
imperfectly competitive markets such as those 
of the brewery and utilities sectors.  
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